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1 Introduction
Around the world, young people are not leaving the parental home; in 2020 more
than 50% of young US population (aged between 18 and 29 years old) were living with their
parents, the highest level since the great depression (Fry et al., 2020), and a 20 percentage
points increase with respect to the 1980 average. In Europe, 69% of those between 16 and
29 years old were living with their parents in 2019 (Eurostat, data for EU-19), for several
countries this implies the highest value since the 1980’s (Schwanitz and Mulder, 2015).
Additionally, young people are facing major affordability challenges;1 millennials across
the world are spending more on housing than any previous generation, while experiencing
a lower quality of life (Judge and Tomlinson, 2018). Previous evidence suggests that these
phenomena could be harming their welfare. Specifically, living with your parents as an
adult is associated with a negative social stigma (Parker, 2012), worse adult child-parent
relationships (Lang (2015) and Tosi (2020)), delayed family formation (Parker, 2012), and a
overall reduction in satisfaction with personal well-being (Fuller-Tyszkiewicz et al., 2016).
Additionally, financial stress, such as that deriving from bad affordability, can lead to
poorer physical and mental health outcomes (French and McKillop (2017) and Vásquez-
Vera et al. (2017)), and lower overall well-being (Netemeyer et al., 2018).
A potential explanation for these phenomena lies in the conditions faced by indi-
viduals when first entering the labor market. For young Europeans, initial labor market
conditions have recently been tough; the unemployment rate among those aged between
15 and 24 years old in the EU was 22% for the 2008-2017 period, five percentage points
higher than for the 1998-2007 period (OECD, data for EU-19). A lower income can mean
an inability to afford to rent or buy and consequently the need to stay in the parental
home. For those who do leave, this may translate into worse affordability. However, bad
initial labor market conditions affect entire cohorts rather than just single individuals, so
the interaction between the labor and housing markets could be important. Specifically, if
prices and rents are flexible and adjust fully to new income levels, housing tenure should
not change. If housing markets are rigid, however, then prices and rents fall to a lesser
extent than income. This forces young people to live with their parents, thereby worsening
their welfare even further.
In this paper, I study how initial labor market conditions can have long-term effects
on housing tenure and affordability. To determine the long-term effects of initial labor
market conditions, the ideal experiment would involve randomly exposing identical grad-
uates to different initial employment conditions (von Wachter, 2020). The best approach
to this experiment so far has consisted of comparing graduates who entered different labor
markets with different unemployment rates. This strategy has been used extensively in
the labor literature (Kahn (2010), Oreopoulos et al. (2012), Schwandt and Von Wachter
(2019)). In this research, I exploit the unemployment rate at the time of college graduation
as an exogenous income shock to study housing outcomes, I do so by comparing different
cohorts of college graduates across different European countries. As the vast majority of
college graduates enter the labor market and become economically active immediately after
graduation, they constitute the best subjects for studying the effects of initial labor market
conditions. Additionally, by working at the country level, concerns regarding the migra-
tion of graduates to other labor markets with better conditions are mitigated, as migration
1Namely, the ratio between housing costs and household income
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between EU countries is very low (Dijkstra and Gakova, 2008). The empirical specifica-
tion follows a cell-based model, in which outcomes are aggregated at the country, year of
graduation, and calendar year, and outcomes are regressed against the unemployment rate
at the country and year of graduation.
For this research I use micro-data from two major European datasets: the European
Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) and the European Commu-
nity Household Panel (ECHP). Both surveys provide cross-sectional information on various
factors such as income, labor and housing conditions, at both the individual and household
level. The ECHP originally covered Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Greece, Spain,
France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Sweden and the United
Kingdom, for the period between 1994 and 2001. After it was discontinued in 2001, the
survey was replaced by the EU-SILC, which addressed virtually the same factors. Further-
more, the EU-SILC sample progressively included other European nations, reaching up to
33 countries by 2018, and include over 10 million individuals. Using these data made it
possible to study the effect of labor market entry in bad times for cohorts from 1960 until
2018. This is the first paper to do so for the entire European Union and, for such a long
period of time, due mainly to the use of cross-sectional data.
This empirical approach provides three key findings. First, the results confirm the
negative, scarring effects that entering the labor market under bad economic conditions
has on housing tenure and affordability. Particularly, a 1 pp increase in the unemployment
rate at the time of graduation leads to a 1.5 pp increase in the probability of living with
parents one year after graduation, which is equal to an increase of 2.9% with respect to the
mean. Effects are persistent over time and are still present 10 years after graduation, with
the accumulated effect after 10 years being 12.5 pp. Second, the results show that a 1 pp
increase in the unemployment rate at the time of graduation decreases the probability of
renting by -1.02 pp (-4.9% with respect to the mean) and by -0.45 pp (-2.0% with respect
to the mean) for homeowner one year after graduation. Third, worse initial labor market
conditions translate into worse affordability ratios for homeowners and renters. These are
due to lower household income and unchanging rents or prices. Additionally, the results
confirm that worse initial labor market conditions lead to lower earnings, lower employment
probability, lower employment quality, higher probability of receiving governmental housing
aid and lower probability of being married or having a child. These results are in line with
previous studies.
In this setting, however, it is imperative to analyze how housing markets can absorb
or amplify the initial labor market shock. To understand this, I develop an OLG model in
which agents live for three periods and have three different housing tenure choices (living
with parents, renting and, owning). Agents accumulate housing and non-housing wealth,
and consume a numeraire good. In my model, agents prefer ownership over renting, and
renting over living with parents. Additionally, as younger agents are poorer than older
agents, this implies that they will be outbid in the housing market and only young agents
will be forced to live with their parents. As for the rental market, I allow only older agents
to become landlords, which makes the rental supply endogenous. Also, I introduce an
outside option for the rental market, and landlords will choose the outside option if the
rent they obtain from young agents is too low. The existence of outside options in the rental
market has been documented in several ways; for example as conversion of residential units
to short-term tourism accommodation (Garcia-López et al., 2020), as conversion to office
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units (Beauregard, 2005), or leaving the unit empty (Segú, 2020). The outside option will
work as a floor price for rents, thereby introducing rigidity into the rental market.
I use the model to explore what would happen if there is a permanent and negative
income shock to young agents only. In particular, I study two different scenarios. In the
first scenario, the outside option is not binding so rental markets are flexible (∆%income =
∆%rents). In this case, income shock in young agents will not change the share of agents
living with their parents, as rents fully adjust to the young agents’ new income. However,
as housing prices depend on the income of both young and old agents, they will not fall
as much as the income of young agents, thus reducing the share of young homeowners.
Affordability for young renters will not worsen as rents fall in the same proportion as their
income. In the second scenario, with the rental outside option active, rental markets are
rigid (∆%income > ∆%rents). In this case, the model predicts that the share of young
agents living with their parents will increase, as some can no longer afford to rent. As
in the previous case, prices are not fully responsive to changes in the income of young
agents, so the share of young homeowners decreases. For young renters affordability will
get worse, as their incomes decrease but rents do not. In both scenarios, the welfare of
young agents decreases, but this is more pronounced when rental markets are rigid, as the
share of agents in their least preferred housing tenure option increases and affordability
ratios are worse.
Additionally, this model is also useful to provide policy insights. In this regard,
the numerical solution of the model provides some understanding into housing policies
when there is a negative income shock to young individuals. To achieve this, I use housing
allowances in France as a case study. This is an relevant case, as almost one in three French
households receive a housing allowance, one of the highest rates in the OECD. Additionally,
at 0.72% of national GDP, these allowances account for a large part of government spending,
i.e. the fourth largest expenditure in the OECD (OECD, 2018). On average households
receive 30% of their housing expenditure, with 90% living in rental units (Hananel and
Richet-Mastain, 2019). In the model, I translate this policy into one in which 30% of
poorest agents receive housing aid equivalent to 30% of the rental market price. The
results indicate that this type of policy is effective at alleviating the welfare impact of
negative income shocks in rigid rental markets. Such policies can help recover part of the
lost welfare due to a labor market shock, as it helps young agents access rental units and
improve their affordability ratio. However, this policy creates the opposite results when
applied in flexible rental markets scenarios, as it does not allow for rents and prices to
adjust, creating prices and rents inflation, a phenomenon detected on the French housing
aid system (Bozio et al., 2017). Additionally, in this case the welfare gains are captured
by landlords, that are concentrated on older agents.
The contribution of this paper is three-fold. First, it expands on the literature on
the persistent effects of initial labor market conditions, by proving that existing conditions
at the time of graduation can have negative and scarring effects on housing tenure and
affordability. So far literature has focused on labor market outcomes, such as individual
earnings (Raaum and Røed (2006) Kahn (2010), Genda et al. (2010), Oreopoulos et al.
(2012), Kawaguchi and Murao (2014), Brunner and Kuhn (2014), Liu et al. (2016), Cockx
and Ghirelli (2016), and Fernández-Kranz and Rodríguez-Planas (2018)). More recently,
other variables outside the labor market have been studied, such as health status (Cur-
rie and Schwandt (2014), and Maclean and Hill (2015)), mortality (Schwandt and von
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Wachter, 2020), and family formation (Currie and Schwandt, 2014). This research builds
on Schwandt and Von Wachter (2019), who extend the existing methodology into large
cross-sectional data bases and study the effects of initial labor market conditions on career
and socioeconomic outcomes such as poverty incidence and health insurance. In this pa-
per, I further extend the analysis to housing outcomes, adding an entire new perspective
to the welfare impacts of initial labor market conditions. My results suggest that the con-
sequences of bad initial labor market conditions may have been larger that what previous
literature suggested. Additionally, while most studies focus on a one-country case study,
my analysis covers 33 EU countries. Moreover, by using cross-sectional data, I am able
to study entire cohorts from 1960 to 2018. This allows me to capture in a better way the
long-term dynamics behind housing outcomes.
Second, I extend the framework of the OLG models with housing markets. I show
that these models not only can be used for analyzing housing allocation, but also they
are a useful tool for welfare and policy analysis. In Ortalo-Magné and Rady (2004) the
authors use an OLG model to introduce the idea of a housing ladder, in which agents
move according to their age and income, from less preferred housing options to more
valued ones. In the study by Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2006), authors use an OLG model
to show how the ability of young agents to afford down-payment on a starter home can
affect the entire housing allocation in the economy. Additionally, authors show a positive
correlation between the income of young individuals and housing prices in the economy.
In a more recent study, Carozzi (2020) develops an OLG model with no uncertainty and
housing quality to relate changes in the composition of housing sales to credit constraint
shocks. In his model, younger poorer agents are outbid of home-ownership by wealthier
households. Still, all the previous models assume perfect elasticity for prices and rents
which may constrain the analysis and may be unrealistic. I contribute to this strand
of literature by developing an OLG model to study housing allocation, affordability and
welfare. Additionally, I introduce an outside rental option, a feature present in several
rental markets. By doing so, I show that the rental market can either absorb or amplify the
welfare impact of initial labor market conditions, depending on its rigidity. Additionally,
this is the first paper to use these models to perform policy analysis.
Third, this paper contributes to policy design towards housing markets. I show that
housing aid policies can be effective to absorb part of the shock that comes from the labor
market. However, if markets are able to adjust to income shocks, then applying a policy
of this kind will lead to worse results for the targeted population and to welfare gains con-
centrating on landlords. This highlights the importance of identifying the correct scenario
for applying these policies to ensure that welfare gains benefit the targeted population.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 focuses on describing the data used,
while providing some descriptive statistics, and outlining the empirical strategy; section 3
presents the results of the main specification and some heterogeneous analysis; section 4
provides a stylized version of the housing ladder model, from which a set of propositions is
derived, and the welfare and policy analysis is done; and, finally, section 5 presents some
concluding remarks.
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2 Data and Empirical Strategy
For the purposes of this research I use the micro-data from two major European
datasets: the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC)
and the European Community Household Panel (ECHP). The EU-SILC is designed and
overseen by Eurostat, and is compulsory for all EU member states. Despite the fact that
the survey is carried out by each individual state, Eurostat defines a common framework
to ensure a harmonized set of variables. Data collection for these surveys is based on a
nationally representative probability sample of the population residing in private house-
holds within the country, irrespective of language, nationality and, legal residence status.
These surveys cover all private households, and all persons over the age of 16 within the
household are potential respondents2. Both surveys provide cross-sectional information on
various aspects such as income, labor and housing conditions, at both the household and
the individual level. Additionally, they also provide longitudinal data so that changes can
be measured over a four year period.
Figure 1: Data Availability
Notes: Data availability across European countries. As the ECHP finished in 2001 and the EU-SILC only
started in 2004, no data are available for 2002 or 2003.
The ECHP originally covered Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Greece, Spain,
France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom, from 1994 to 2001. After the survey was discontinued in 2001, it was replaced
by the EU-SILC, which covered virtually the same aspects. In addition, the EU-SILC
2A more detailed account of the methodology used for EU-SILC can be found in Eurostat (2018) and
for ECHP in Eurostat (1996)
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gradually included other European nations, and by 2018 the sample included 33 countries.
A detailed table showing the countries and data availability is presented in Annex A, and
a map of the countries with their incorporation date is depicted in Figure 1.
National-level unemployment is available from the European Central Bank (ECB),
and data are generally available from 1960. This is the main data source used to measure
labor market conditions at the time of graduation.
2.1 Empirical Strategy
The ideal experiment to study the effect of initial labor market conditions on housing
outcomes would be to randomly expose newly graduates to different initial conditions. This
would result in a regression:
Housingi,t = α+ βeinitiali0 + γe + εi,t (1)
In which Housingi,t is the housing outcome of interest, namely whether or not the
individual is living in the parental home, at a given time t. initiali0 refers to the initial
labor market conditions faced by individual i at time 0. Potential years of experience is
denoted by e, which is computed as the number of years since graduation; therefore γe
is potential experience fixed effects. With these fixed effects, βe captures the potential
experience specific deviation from the typical experience profile caused by different initial
labor market conditions.
The standard application of Equation 1 has been to compare newly graduates across
different labor markets with different unemployment rates, as in Schwandt and VonWachter
(2019) and Oreopoulos et al. (2012). For this analysis I work with a cell-based model in
which I collapse the outcome of interest at the country (c), cohort of graduation (g), and
calendar year (t). This analysis does not rely on the use of individual-level controls and so
it matches the level of variation of the variable of interest, which is cohort-country-year.
The baseline specification is as follows:
Yc,g,t = α+ βeug,c + γe + δc + ηg + θt + εc,g,t (2)
Where ug,c refers to the unemployment rate of the given country c3 in a graduation
year g. This is the main variable of interest. e refers to potential years of labor market
experience4. Given the presence of experience, country, cohort, and time fixed effects, and
given that there is no control for the current unemployment rate, then βe captures the effect
of an increase in the unemployment rate at the time of graduation, considering the regular
subsequent evolution of the national labor market (Schwandt and Von Wachter, 2019)5.
Errors are clustered at the cohort-country level to account for group-specific correlation.
Cells are weighted by their corresponding cell size, to represent population-level estimates.
In line with the reasoning proposed by von Wachter (2020), consider the example
in which Yc,g,t is the share of cohort g from country c that is living in the parental home,
then γe should capture the regular decrease in the share of people living with their parents
with years of experience. Then βe captures the deviation in the share of individuals living
3Country refers to the country of current residence.
4Potential experience is calculated as calendar year minus graduation year.
5For this specification, I present individual coefficients for each of the first 10 years after graduation,
but I create a dummy variable for those potential years equal to or greater than 11. This last coefficient
should indicate the long term effect of the initial unemployment rate.
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with their parents from the regular experience profile at each experience year, and when
considered together, the βe should capture the change in experience profile caused by
the initial unemployment rate. Additionally, given the year and country dummies, the
variation in each country’s unemployment rate consists of changes over time (relative to
its own mean, captured by the country-specific coefficient δc) that differ from the EU
economic cycle (captured by year specific coefficient θt). These country-specific cyclical
changes in the unemployment rate identify the shifts in the experience profiles caused by
bad initial conditions.
The data used for this paper offers an advantage over the previous literature, given
that it allows an individual’s exact year of graduation to be identified. This helps avoid
the use of proxy measures for the year of graduation (such as the Mincerian approach6),
which increase the probability of measurement errors in highly heterogeneous contexts
such as Europe’s different educational systems across countries and time. Additionally,
working with cross-sectional data provides an opportunity to cover a larger sample than
that allowed by traditional longitudinal surveys. This makes it possible to study the long-
term effects of initial labor market conditions for cohorts starting as early as 1960 up to
2018.
2.1.1 Potential Threats to Identification
This strategy has two major potential threats. The first refers to endogenous grad-
uation timing. Individuals can potentially shift their graduation according to the labor
market conditions at the time of their intended graduation. If this were the case, the
estimates would be biased to zero. As shown in Figure B.2 of the Annex, a higher un-
employment rate at graduation time increases the probability of being a full-time student
for recent low and medium graduates. This indicates that elementary and high school
graduates facing harsh economic conditions at graduating are more likely to stay in the
education system. However, a higher unemployment rate does not increase the probability
that college graduates will continue to study. This indicates that, despite an individual’s
concerns about the state of the economy at the time of graduation, completing higher
education translates into entering the labor market. This threat to identification has been
faced by previous studies, and following their strategy is that I restrict the sample study
to college graduates (Kahn, 2010).
The second potential threat arises from endogenous migration. If individuals choose
to move to avoid the economic conditions in their place of residence when graduating, by
assigning their current place of residence as their graduation location, individuals would
probably be assigned better economic conditions than those they would have faced. This
would lead to an attenuation bias in the results. Endogenous moving has been documented
for the US, for example by Wozniak (2010), whereby individuals facing harsh labor market
conditions at the time of their graduation in their home state decide to move to another
state. However, as shown by Dijkstra and Gakova (2008), while around 2% of the working
population moves from one state to another every year in the US, in the EU-27, only
0.14% of the working-age population changed residence to another EU country. Therefore,
as cross-national border mobility in the EU is generally low, endogenous migration does
not pose a threat to this study.
6The Mincerian year of graduation is often calculated as the sum of the year of birth, plus six, plus the
years of reported education.
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2.2 Sample Restrictions and Descriptive Statistics
Given the above mentioned potential identification concerns, this analysis focuses
only on the native population with higher education7. Thus, to identify a graduation year
and country, I exclude all individuals who were not born in the same country as they were
interviewed. Additionally, I exclude those who graduated in the same year as the interview
to avoid measurement errors, as many variables are measured with respect to the year prior
to the interview.
Table 1 shows summary statistics of the sample for the main variables of interest.
I separate the variables into two groups: those relating to housing outcomes and those
relating to the labor market. For housing tenure, I consider the living arrangement as a
set of three options. These are: (1) living with at least one parent, (2) being a homeowner
without any parent present in the household, and (3) being a renter without any parent
present8. Finally, I also include a measure of affordability to indicate the effort required by
a household to meet its housing costs. Affordability is traditionally computed as the ratio
between housing costs (either down payment or rent) and the household income. With
respect to labor outcomes, I show the employment rate, different measures for earnings
at both a personal and household level, the number of hours worked in a week and, a
temporary employment indicator.
Table 1 shows that living with parents is much more common among recent graduates
compared with the general population. Similarly, newly graduates are less likely to be
homeowners or renters. In the labor market, newly graduates have lower incomes and
a higher rate temporary employment, despite having higher employment levels than the
general population.
7Given that educational systems can vary greatly between European countries, I segmented the different
possible educational levels into three broad categories. First, the lowest possible educational achievement:
primary education and first stage secondary education. Second, higher education including undergraduate
studies. Third, all other possible educational achievment, which consisted mainly of second-stage secondary
education, and all other professional and technical education. From now on, when referring to college
graduates, I will refer to the second group.
8In the rest of the paper, "with Parents" indicates the share of the cohort living with at least one parent.
When using the term "Homeowner" I mean being a homeowner without any parent in the household. The
same is true for the term "Renter". Other living arrangements such as living rent-free represent less than
5% of the total population.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Graduation Cohorts Across Europe
By Gender One year
after grad.Housing arrangement Full Sample Male Female
With parents 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.52
Owner 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.23
Renter 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.21
Affordability 0.17 0.16 0.18 0.20
Labor outcomes
Employed 0.54 0.56 0.51 0.64
Personal monthly gross income e 1,806 2,148 1,451 1,411
Personal annual net income e 11,714 12,124 9,283 6,633
Household annual net income e 37,842 39,349 36,318 34,744
Average weekly hours worked 21.1 23.4 18.7 24.9
Temporary employment 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.24
Notes: All values are converted to euros and then deflated to harmonic price index (HPI which is
calculated by the ECB) with a base year of 2018. Personal annual net income and household annual net
income are measured with respect to the year prior to the interview, while personal monthly gross income
is measured as current income. Temporary employment represents the share of the cohort working under
a temporary contract. Owner represents the share of the cohort living in an owned house without any
parent present. Renter represents the share of the cohort living in a rental unit without any parent
present. "with Parents" indicates the share of the cohort living with at least one parent. Affordability is
calculated as total housing expenses over the household’s annual net income.
3 Results
3.1 Housing Market Outcomes
One of the main objectives of this study is to determine whether bad initial economic
conditions can have long-term effects on housing tenure and affordability. For the purposes
of this study, I will focus on whether individuals live in the parental home (labeled as "with
Parents"), live in an owned unit with no parent present (labeled as "Owner"), or live with
no parents in a rental unit (labeled as "Renter")9. Figure 2 shows the βe coefficients from
Equation 2. These coefficients capture the shift of the share of individuals living with their
parents from the typical in the potential experience year profile due to an increase in the
unemployment rate at the time of graduation, given the regular subsequent evolution of
the labor market10.
9"With parents" is defined as an individual living with at least one person who can be identified as
his or her biological, step, adoptive or foster parent, or guardian. "Owner" refers to a person living in a
dwelling that is owned by one member of the household, without any parent being present. Households
could potentially live in rent-free accommodation, provided by either family or the state, this is not a
common situation, especially among young people.
10As results are based on the cell model from Equation 2, the coefficients can be interpreted as the share
of the cohort living in the parental home, but also as the probability that the individual will live in the
parental home
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Figure 2: Effect of a one-point increase in the unemployment rate at graduation time on
living with parents.
Notes: Effect of a one point increase in the unemployment rate on the probability of living with parents.
"With parents" refers to living in a dwelling where at least one parent is present, irrespective of the tenure
status. The mean one year after graduation is 52%. Results are based on Equation 2. Data from ECHP
and EU-SILC.
The results indicate that a 1 pp increase at the time of graduation increases the
probability of staying in the parental home by 1.5 pp one year after graduation or, when
compared to the mean in Table 1, an increase of 2.9%. The effect decreases, but an increase
of 1 pp in the unemployment rate at the time of graduation increases the probability of
living with the parents by 0.6 pp in the 10th year after graduation. The accumulated effect
after ten years is 12.5 pp. Detailed results with the values of the coefficients are presented
in Table C.2 of the Annex.
While younger households choose stay at home with their parents, it is necessary to
identify which option, i.e., renting or ownership, they are giving up. The results shown
in Figure 3a indicate that it is a combination of the two. Worse economic conditions at
graduation time lead to a lower probability of renting with no parent present, with the
effect being -1.02 pp (-4.9% when compared to the mean) one year after graduation. This
effect follows a similar pattern to that of living with parents, with the largest coefficients
being immediately after graduation. The effect is no longer significant approximately eight
years after graduation.
Finally, while a 1 pp increase in the unemployment rate leads to a lower fraction
of homeowners of -0.45 pp in the first year after graduation, it implies a -2.0% decrease
with respect to the mean in Table 1, and its effect isstill significant after 10 years. The
smaller initial magnitude in owners than in renters could be explained by the fact that the
majority of newly graduates do not opt to buy a home immediately after graduation. By
contrast, most graduates buy a home some years after graduation, after they have been
able to save for a given period of time. This could help explain why the coefficient is
stronger approximately six years after graduation. The effect on ownership is interesting
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because it points to a different long-term dynamic than in previous literature that has
focused on labor outcomes. The results shown here suggest that focusing solely on the
years immediately after graduation could lead to an underestimation of the actual impact
of initial labor market conditions on given outcomes. The magnitude of the effect on living
with parents is approximately the same as the sum of the effect on renters and owners.
This indicates that the empirical strategy correctly captures the tenure options of young
individuals.
Figure 3: Effect of a one-point increase in the unemployment rate at the time of gradu-
ation on housing tenure and affordability.
(a) Tenure status. (b) Affordability for owners and renters
Notes: Sub-figure a) depicts the effect of a 1 pp increase in the unemployment rate at the time of graduation
on the probability of being an owner and renter. "Owner" refers to living in dwelling owned by one member
of the household, without any parent being present. Similarly, "renter" refers to living in a dwelling that is
being rented by the household but without any parent present. The mean one year after graduation is 21%
for "renter" and 23% for "owner". Sub-figure b) depicts the effect of a 1 pp increase in the unemployment
rate at the time of graduation on housing affordability for owners and renters. Affordability is calculated
as the yearly housing costs over the household’s yearly income. Results are based on Equation 2. Data
from EU-SILC.
Affordability is commonly computed as the coefficient between yearly housing costs
and household yearly income11. Therefore, higher levels of this ratio indicate a greater effort
by the household to meet its housing living expenses. The results in Figure 3b show that
an increase in the unemployment rate at the time of graduation worsens the affordability
ratio for both those living in rented accommodation and those living in owned units. The
effect is a 0.27 pp increase one year after graduation in the affordability ratio for renters,
and a 1.0% increase when compared to the mean. Over a 10 year period, this implies a
3.3 pp increase in the affordability ratio. With respect to affordability for those who own
their unit, the effect implies a 0.13 pp increase one year after graduation, a 0.6% increase
when compared to the mean, and an accumulated effect of 0.15 pp over a 10 year period.
As mentioned above affordability is calculated as the ratio between rent (or mort-
gage) paid and household income. Therefore, variation in this ratio could arise from either
of these two variables. For example, if one assumes that worse initial labor market con-
ditions lead to lower household income, in the case that rental costs and prices fall in the
11Due to data availability, the measure used here is housing costs which include not only the rent or
mortgage, but other living costs, such as building insurance, regular maintenance and repairs, utilities (for
rental units) and other services and charges. While including these other factors could introduce undesired
sources of variation, in any case, rent or mortgage payments constitute the majority of housing costs.
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same proportion, the affordability ratio should remain the same. On the other hand, if
household income falls but rental costs and prices are somewhat rigid and do not decrease
less than income, then this could lead to worse (i.e., higher) affordability ratios. This latter
hypothesis seems to be confirmed in Figure 4. The results show that, while the effect on
housing costs remains close to zero, there is a negative and significant effect on household
income for both owners and renters. These results are in line with those previously re-
ported and indicate that worse affordability arises mainly from a reduction in household
income rather than a rise in housing costs.
Figure 4: Effect of a one-point increase in the unemployment rate at graduation time on
housing costs and household income.
(a) Log of housing costs (b) Log of household income
Overall, poor economic conditions at graduation time therefore seem to have a sig-
nificant effect on young people’s housing outcomes. If I consider one standard deviation
in the unemployment rate in our sample, i.e., an increase of 4.4 pp in the unemployment
rate, then the increase in the share of young graduates living with their parents one year
after graduation associated with such deviation is 6.75 pp. Additionally, such a deviation
could imply worse affordability ratios for both renters and owners. The magnitude of such
effects suggests that a typical recession in the labor market has the potential to affect the
housing market through the tenure decision of young people.
3.1.1 Heterogeneity Analysis
Given the different characteristics presented by the sample, it is important to analyze
the results for different sub-samples at a time. This provides further evidence on how initial
labor conditions can affect individuals. For visualization purposes, I will focus only on the
probability of individuals living with their parents12.
First, as shown in Figure 5, the results differ slightly with respect to the gender
dimension. The impacts on living with parents are higher for males and also more persistent
in time. While for men, a 1 pp in the unemployment rate at the time of graduation
translates into a 1.77 pp increase in the probability of living with parents one year after
12For these results, the equation used is the following:
Yc,g,t = α+ βeug,cX + γe + δc + ηg + θt + εc,g,t (3)
Where the only difference with respect to Equation 2, it includes the variable X, which is a dummy variable
that takes a value equal to one if the cell corresponds to the group of interest and zero otherwise.
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graduation; for women the value is 1.30 pp. While for men the effect with respect to
the mean represents a 3.29% increase, this figure is 2.66% for women. The smaller effect
on females could be explained by the lower labor force participation rate among women.
While 58% of males are employed within the first year after graduation, only 52% of newly
graduated women work in the first year after graduation. Since this is a shock in the labor
market, female individuals that were not planning to enter the labor market may not be
affected by the shock.
Figure 5: Results by gender on probability of living with parents
Notes: Effect of a one-point increase in the unemployment rate on the probability of living with parents,
understood as living in a dwelling where at least one parent is present, irrespective of the tenure status.
Results are based on Equation 3. Data from ECHP and EU-SILC.
As the housing opportunities faced by young people vary dramatically when they
live in a city or rural environment, it is also important to shed light on the heterogeneous
results in this area13. With respect to the effect on the probability of living with parents,
it appears that the magnitude on individuals in rural areas is larger than for those in
urban. While the effect is 1.85 pp in the case of rural areas, the figure is 0.90 pp in
urban settings one year after graduation. The effect when compared to the mean is 3.2%
and 1.92%, respectively. Rental markets differ greatly between urban and rural areas;
therefore, a potential explanation is that rental markets play a role in how income shocks
affect housing tenure.
13Due to data availability, this analysis in particular restricts the sample only to countries and years for
which data on urban density are available. This excludes all countries before 2005 and particularly the
Netherlands throughout the entire sample, and Germany and France for the years 2016, 2017 and 2018.
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Figure 6: Results by urban density on probability of living with parents
Notes: Effect of a one point increase in the unemployment rate on the probability of living with parents,
understood as living in a dwelling where at least one parent is present, irrespective of the tenure status.
Results are based on Equation 3. Data from ECHP and EU-SILC.
To analyze whether the size of the rental market plays a role in the results; I split
the sample into countries with "large" versus "small" rental markets. I label a country
as having "large rental market" if the share of households living in rental units is larger
than the EU-27 mean for 2017 (which is equal to 30%), and countries with "small rental
market" are those below the median14. The results show that the effects for countries with
large rental markets are negative, while countries with smaller rental markets drive most
of the results.
Rental markets could play a major role in how the shock ends up affecting housing
tenure decisions. A potential mechanism is that if the rental market is occupied primarily
by young people, then a large market with the ability to adjust to demand shocks should
be better at absorbing shocks such as those experienced by newly graduates. This point
will be discussed at length in section 4.
14The countries with large rental markets are: Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Nether-
lands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
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Figure 7: Results by size of rental market on probability of living with parents.
(a) Living with parents
Notes: Effect of a one point increase in the unemployment rate on the probability of living with parents,
understood as living in a dwelling where at least one parent is present, irrespective of the tenure status.
Results are based on Equation 2. Data from ECHP and EU-SILC.
3.1.2 Robustness
In this section, I test whether the results previously presented are robust to different
specifications and measures. First, I test whether using an alternative measure for the
national unemployment rate causes any change to the results. As unemployment rates
can be calculated based on different criteria across countries, I use estimates for national
unemployment rates by the International Labour Organization (ILO), which provides data
for all countries in the sample starting from 1991. The ILO unemployment rate should
provide a more harmonic measure of unemployment across countries than that of the
ECB or national statistics institutes, with the caveat the date only goes back as far as
1991. Figure E.10 in Annex E replicates the main results using the ILO unemployment
rate, along with the baseline results. Results show that coefficients obtained using the
ILO unemployment rate are not significantly different to locally calculated unemployment
rates.
Second, a problem could arise from binning the long-term effect from 11 or more
years of potential experience into a single coefficient. Potentially, by binning coefficients,
some dynamics that take place in the medium to long-term could be lost. Figure E.9 in
Annex E replicates the main results for the main specification using different thresholds
for the long-term effects, with individual coefficients up to 20 years after graduation. The
results show that the effect persists over time, with each new coefficient being closer to
zero than the one before. This suggests that the effect does indeed tend to fade over time.
Third, I also test for different model specifications. I control for country-year fixed
effects. The graphs are depicted in Figure E.11 in Annex E. The results show that there is




3.2.1 Labor Market Outcomes
Using graduation time as exogenous, I study the effect of the initial labor market
conditions at graduation time on various outcomes later in life. Figure 8 shows the coeffi-
cients of βe for each experience year. As shown, an increase in the unemployment rate at
the time of graduation has a negative impact on both personal as on household earnings.
Figure 8: Effect of a one-point increase in the unemployment rate at graduation time on
annual earnings and household income.
Notes: Effect of a one-point increase in the unemployment rate on the log annual personal earnings, and
net household income, both measured in the previous year. Results are based on Equation 2. Data from
ECHP and EU-SILC.
The results indicate that a rise in unemployment at the time of graduation leads to
lower personal earnings; specifically, a 1 pp increase in the unemployment rate at gradua-
tion time leads to an 11% decrease in personal earnings in the first year after graduating.
While this effect fades over time, it is still present 10 years after graduation. The results
indicate that the accumulative effect of a 1 pp increase in the unemployment rate at grad-
uation on earnings after 10 years is about 38% of average annual earnings. It is important
to note that, as the surveys capture all individuals, and not only those that entered the
labor market, then the effect also captures those individuals who did not enter the labor
market, as well as those with longer spells of unemployment.
Concerning previous studies, the estimates are somewhat larger. The most similar
study, given that it uses several cohorts is Schwandt and Von Wachter (2019), who found
that a 1 pp increase in the unemployment rate leads to a loss of 3.8% in earnings during
the first three years after graduation, although these estimates are increased slightly once
they control for endogenous graduation timing. For Oreopoulos et al. (2012) the effect of
a 3 pp increase in the unemployment rate leads to a 6% loss in earning during the first
year after graduation. However, Kahn (2010) found that a 1 pp increase in the regional
unemployment rate leads to a 9.2% loss in annual earnings. Despite this, it is important
to state that context of these studies differs significantly from mine, since these papers
focused on North America, and in the case of Oreopoulos et al. (2012) and Kahn (2010) on
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male college graduates only. Additionally, this paper deals with the world crisis in 2008,
which could potentially have had a larger effect than previous recessions.
The data allows me to study the causes behind this drop in personal income. The
results show that an increase in the unemployment rate at the time of graduation leads to
a lower probability of being employed in the years following graduation. A 1 pp increase in
the unemployment rate at the time of graduation leads to 1.2 pp decrease in the probability
of being employed in the first year after graduation. With respect to those who are working,
they have a higher probability of being employed under a temporary contract rather that
a permanent one. A 1 pp increase in the unemployment rate at graduation time leads to a
0.9 pp increase in the probability of being employed under a temporary contract in the first
year, which implies an increase of 3.7% when compared to the mean. Additionally, for those
who were working at the time of the interview, being exposed to a higher unemployment
rate leads to lower labor intensity, with individuals working fewer hours per week. In this
case, a 1 pp increase in the unemployment rate leads to a 4.5% decrease in the average
number of hours worked per week.
In terms of the impact on household income, the magnitude of the effect is much
smaller than on personal income, with a decrease of 0.9% in the first year after gradua-
tion for every 1 pp increase in the unemployment rate at the time of graduation. This
difference between the personal and household effect can be partially explained by the
results presented in the previous section. This attenuation could potentially occur because
household income also captures parental income if the individuals have not moved. If in-
dividuals choose to stay in the parental home, and parents are not affected to the same
extent as newly graduates by an increase in the unemployment rate, then the household
income will have a lower effect than personal income. In this case, the results are similar
in magnitude to those of Schwandt and Von Wachter (2019), with a 1.0% reduction in the
household income one year after graduation for each 1 pp increase in the unemployment
rate the previous year. Table C.3 in the Annex presents the results in detail, and shows
the coefficients for different potential experience years.
3.2.2 Mediation Analysis
The results so far have shown that bad initial labor market conditions lead to a higher
probability that an individual will live in the parental home, and have a lower personal
income. However, it is important to verify that the effect on living with one’s parents is
actually caused by the lower income or whether it is another simultaneous effect derived
from poor initial conditions. To answer this question, I perform a mediation analysis.
Mediation analysis is often used to determine the mechanisms behind the relationship
between a treatment and its outcome. The idea is to identify an ”indirect effect” that
operates through a mediator variable, and a ”direct effect” that takes account of the other
mechanisms. If the effect of the treatment variable works entirely through the mediator,
it is called full mediation. Mediation analysis has been used extensively across the social
sciences. In economics, some recent examples can be found in Huber (2015), whose authors
used this method of analysis to study the mechanisms behind the decrease in the gender
wage gap in the US. A key point in mediation analysis is to ensure that the indirect effect is
statistically significant. A valid strategy is to use bootstrapping as pointed out by Memon
et al. (2018).
Application to this study would help clarify the mechanisms by which the unemploy-
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ment level at the time of graduation affects housing outcomes. In this case, the mediation
variable is the individual’s income.15 The results shown in Figure D.8 in the Annex sug-
gest the, in the first few years after graduation almost the totality of the effect on the
probability of living with parents is explained by the income effect. In the first few years
after graduation, the direct effect is not statistically different from zero, which means that
the total effect and the indirect effect to have very similar coefficients. These results point
to the fact that the effects of bad initial labor market condition are mostly the result of an
income channel in the first few years after graduation.
3.2.3 Other Outcomes: Housing Aid, Family Formation, and Health Status
There are ways in which a younger household can decide to cope with the shock
and still be able to leave the parental home. A potential strategy is to rely on external
economic aid to meet housing costs. This aid can come from the parents or the government
through special housing aid. I now explore these two possibilities.
I study whether young households that leave the parental home after graduating in
worse economic conditions receive larger amounts of money from another household. The
results indicate that a higher unemployment rate at the time of graduation leads to an
increase in the amount received from another household when not living in the parental
home. For those living in the parental home, the effect is the opposite. This suggests
that, while some individuals still decide to leave the parental home, they can do so by
receiving regular money from the parental household. In particular, a 1 pp increase in the
unemployment rate at the time of graduation increases the amount received from another
household by 3.5%. This effect is statistically significant up to seven years after graduation.
For households that leave the parental home, an increase in the unemployment rate also
increases the amount of housing allowance received from the government. The effect is a
0.6% increase in the amount received in housing allowances from the government although
this is not statistically significant. The results are shown in Figure C.7 in the Annex.
These results concerning housing aid are broadly in line with the duration of the
effects of the unemployment rate at the time of graduation on the probability of renting
and being a homeowner, with the effect on renting becoming statistically insignificant eight
years after graduation and the effect on being a homeowner reaching its lowest negative
value six years after graduation. This suggests that parental households assist their adult
children with housing costs until their peers living with parents leave the parental home.
So far, the literature has focused on the effects of initial labor market conditions on
several career outcomes. However, the results presented here have shown that graduating
at a bad time can lead to worse outcomes in housing tenure and affordability. These results
show that the welfare impacts of initial labor market conditions can be underestimated if
one considers only labor market outcomes. In this subsection, I provide some results in
other areas that corroborate the idea of greater welfare impacts.
15In the context of this research this translates into Equation 4.
Parentsc,g,t = α+ βeug,c + κeincg,c + γe + δc + ηg + θt + εc,g,t
incc,g,t = µ+ πeug,c + ρe + σc + τg + υt + εc,g,t
(4)
Following the benchmark approach proposed by Sobel (1982), the indirect effect of income on on individual
staying with parents is equal to the product of κe and πe. The direct effect of unemployment at the time
of graduation on living with one’s parents is given by the coefficient βe. Figure D.8 shows the coefficients
of applying Equation 4 to the data set.
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Initial unemployment conditions can impact other outcomes that are also correlated
with housing tenure and can affect individual welfare. A clear example of this is family
formation. The results in Figure C.5 in the Annex show that worse economic conditions
at graduation time lead to a lower probability of being in a relationship. This is true
when considering not only formal marital relationships, but also consensual unions and
cohabitation with a partner. Overall, individuals are less likely to form part of a couple
(whether formal or not) when the unemployment rate is higher at the time of graduation.
A potential consequence of not being in a relationship is delayed parenthood. The results
indicate that a higher unemployment rate at the time of graduation reduces the probability
of being a parent. These results concerning family formation are significant even 10 years
after graduation. While the coefficient indicates that a 1 pp increase in the unemployment
rate at the time of graduation decreases the probability of becoming a parent by approx-
imately 0.9 pp one year after graduation, the effect is 5.5% when compared to the mean.
The accumulated effect over 10 years is a reduction of approximately 11 pp. These results
are broadly in line with previous literature that found a negative relationship between the
unemployment rate at the time of graduation and childbearing and marriage. Detailed
results are presented in Figure C.5 and Table C.3 in the Annex.
As initial unemployment conditions can have an impact on important outcomes
such as income, housing tenure, and family formation, it is possible that they also affect
an individual’s health. Overall, initial unemployment conditions do not seem to have a
significant impact on an individual’s health. Concretely, an increase in the unemployment
rate at the time of graduation does not affect the probability that individuals will declare
their health status as "bad" or "very bad". Moreover, the unemployment rate at the time
of graduation does not have a significant effect on the probability of suffering from chronic
illness, being limited in one’s daily activity due to their health, or having unmet medical
examination needs in the last year. Detailed results are presented in Figure C.6 and Table
C.5 in the Annex. These results are in line with previous literature as in the case of Cutler
et al. (2015), who found that graduating during periods of high unemployment in Europe
does not have a significant effect on health outcomes for individuals with at least 10 years of
education. With respect to previous studies on the US, Schwandt and Von Wachter (2019)
found that college graduates do not experience a reduction in health insurance coverage as
a result of graduating during bad period.
While this research focuses on college graduates only, section F of the Annex, presents
the results for all educational levels.
4 A Stylized Model
4.1 Set up
In this section, I present a stylized version of the model. I focus on the impact that
a negative income shock to young agents has on housing consumption and affordability,
showing the pivotal role that an outside rental option can have on the outcome. A full
version of this model can be found on section G in the Annex.
Agents are born with no wealth but are heterogeneous in their income and live for
three periods. Let ea(i) be the endowment at age a ∈ (1, 2, 3) of type i ∈ [0, 1], such that
ea(i) → R+ is continuous and increasing, and e1(i) = ψe2(i) where ψ ∈ (0, 1). Only for
this stylized model I will assume a uniform distribution of agents income.
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Agents receive utility from the consumption of a numeraire good and from their
housing tenure choices. Agents prefer ownership over renting and renting over living with
parents16. There is a utility discount β and an interest rate r, and I assume that β(1+r) ≥
1. These assumptions will imply that agents consume no housing in period three as in
Carozzi (2020) so the maximum housing demand is equal to 2.
Agents can choose between three tenure options: live with their parents, rent and
own. The housing stock for ownership is fixed S, and S < 2, so no all agents can rent or
own a unit, and therefore some are forced to live with parents17.
The supply of rental units comes from landlord agents, who own more than one unit
and live in one while renting out the other. I introduce an outside option for rental units,
which works as a price floor in the rental market. This feature has been documented in
several ways: as the possibility of renting out to tourists (Garcia-López et al., 2020), a
reserve value of leaving the accommodation empty (Segú, 2020), or converting housing
into offices (Beauregard, 2005). Landlords decide to rent to younger households as long as
they can afford to pay at least the outside rental option, otherwise they opt for the outside
option.
Prices are depicted as pt, which are prices for housing at time t, and Rt is the rent
paid in advance at time t. In order to own a unit, individuals can borrow an amount γpt,
as long as they have the initial down-payment (1− γ)pt. I impose a restriction whereby a
household can only have one mortgage at a time. Additionally, I assume r < min[γ, 1− γ]
so that households can always pay their debt in the steady state and there is no default.18
In the long term, both rental and ownership markets must be in equilibrium. In the
rental market, the supply of rental units from landlords must be equal to the sum of the
units demanded from older agents, young agents and, (if applicable) the outside option.
Similarly, the fixed supply of owned units (S), must be equal to the sum of the demand
for owned units from older agents, young agents, and the supply of rental units.
In the steady state it is possible to determine some boundaries for housing prices
and rents. For rents, it is possible to show that R = e1(2− So), which implies that rent is
determined solely by young agents’ income. For prices, it is possible to establish a lower
bound: p ≥ e1(2−So)(1−γ)−1. In this case, housing prices are related both to young and
old agents income. This points that while rents are fully linked to young agent’s income,
ownership prices are not. A diagram of how this boundaries works with respect to young
agents’ income is depicted in Figure 9.
16More formally, let Uct,ht be the household’s utility, which can be expressed as Uct,ht = ct + uh(τt)
where ct is the consumption of the numeraire good, and uh(τt) the residential choice at time t. Agents
living with their parents receive zero utility from housing, while agents living in an owned unit receive the
maximum utility vo. Agents in rental units receive uvo utility from housing, and as u < 1 then the utility
from renting is lower that of being owner.
17Setting ψ low enough is enough to ensure that only young agents live with their parents.
18Additionally, there is no guarantee of rp = R in equilibrium as there are no deep pocketed investors.
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Notes: This figure depicts the steady state prices and rents for different levels of young agents’ income (ψ).
While rents are on the 45 degree line, prices have a lower slope, thus indicating that changes in ψ lead to
proportional changes in rents but not in prices. When ψ is low enough, rent in steady state is equal to the
outside option value.
4.2 Allocation and Affordability
I define thresholds in the type distribution of agents that determine the distribution
of households across units. For young agents, the relevant thresholds are iyr and iyo, which
indicate the thresholds young agents can afford to rent and own. For old agents the relevant
thresholds are ioldr and ioldl . These indicate the points at which old agents can afford to
own and to be landlords (i.e., own a unit and rent out the other). Therefore, for young
households we can identify the share of agents living with their parents as iyr , the share
of agents in rental units as iyo − iyr , and the share of agents in owned units as 1 − iyo.
The position of these thresholds depends entirely on the model parameters. They can be
depicted as following:

















Notes: This figure depicts the steady state allocations for young and old individuals, arranged by in-
come. For higher income levels agents locate in their more preferred housing tenure choice, such as
home-ownership. Only young agents face the possibility of living with their parents.
Agents pay different amounts with respect to each housing tenure choice. In partic-
ular they pay zero when living with parents, R when renting, and p(1− γ) when they own
their homes. This defines their affordability ratio for young agents as ϕh where h ∈ [p, r, o]
for those living with parents, renting, and homeowners respectively. As housing costs re-
main constant within the tenure options, agents differ in their affordability ratio according
to their income.
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The marginal renter is the individual who can barely afford to rent, spending all of
its income on rent, thus having an affordability ratio equal to one. As income increases
the affordability ratio decreases, up to the wealthiest renter, who pays the same price for
the rental unit as the marginal renter but has a highest income. The wealthiest renter
has the lowest affordability ratio, as the price paid for the housing unit takes up the least
amount of income. The average affordability ratio for rental agents is the average of the
affordability ratios between the marginal renter and the wealthiest renter. It is also possible
to define the average affordability for renters as the average between the affordability of
the marginal and the wealthiest renter. This provides an index measure to reveal how
affordability changes between housing tenure groups. The same analogous can be said for
young owners.
4.3 Propositions
In this section I analyze the impact of a negative income shock on young individuals,
depicted as a permanent decrease in ψ. I focus on two scenarios: one in which the rental
markets has downward flexibility, which means that the outside rental option plays no
role, and the other with downward flexibility in the rental markets, which implies that the
outside option functions as a price floor.
4.3.1 Case 1: Flexible Rental Markets
If the rental markets are flexible, then a decrease in the income of young agents
should cause a proportional decrease in rents. This is due to the fact that as young agents
are the only marginal renters, the rent level will follow the marginal renters’ income, to
keep housing markets in equilibrium. This dynamic is depicted in Figure 11a.

























(b) Housing allocation in steady state
Notes: The figure on the left shows the effect on equilibrium rent for a negative shock in income for young
households (depicted by ψ). In this case the shock is translated into a proportional drop in rents, thus
making steady state rent flexible. The figure on the right shows the housing allocation for young households
in steady state, according to different income levels for young households (depicted by ψ). Both figures
depict a scenario in which there is a uniform distribution of agents’ income.
Figure 11b shows the steady state housing allocations for young households for dif-
23
ferent levels of ψ. When ψ lowers, young agents are poorer in relation to older agents. This
means that they will settle for the least preferred housing options, as they are outbid by
older, wealthier households. Since rents adjust perfectly to the young agent’s new income
in this case, the share of young agents living with their parents, depicted by ir, will remain
the same. However, as prices do not adjust fully to the new income of young agents, some
of them will no longer be able to afford to become a homeowner. In this case, there will
be a group of agents that were owners with the previous allocations, but are now renters,
thus making the total share of young agents living in rental units increase (this is depicted
by the shift from io to i′o). In this way, the number of housing units consumed by agents
in equilibrium remains the same.
The shock will affect young renters’ average affordability. While the marginal renter
(i.e., between living with parents and renting) will still spend all of its income on rent,
the new wealthiest renter will spend less of its income on housing costs. This is because
the wealthiest renter is now an agent who otherwise would have been a homeowner. Even
though the income of this agent falls, the price paid for housing consumption shifted from
an owned unit to a rental one. Paying for an owned unit is always more expensive than
paying for a rental one, thereby making its affordability ratio drop. In this way, the average
affordability ratio for renters also drops.
4.3.2 Case 2: Rigid Rental Markets
If rental markets are rigid, meaning that the outside option works as a price floor in
the rental market, then a drop in income for young individuals will not cause a proportional
fall in rental prices. It could even be the case that rental markets are fully rigid, meaning
that rents will not respond to a drop in young agents’ income. This case is depicted in
Figure 12a.
























(b) Housing allocation in steady state
Notes: The figure on the left shows the effect on equilibrium rent for a negative shock in income for
young households (depicted by ψ). In this case the initial equilibrium rent is already equal to the outside
option rent, making that the steady state rent to be fully rigid. The figure on the right shows the housing
allocation for young households in steady state, according to different levels of income for young households
(depicted by ψ). Both figures depict a scenario in which there is a uniform income distribution on agents
income.
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As a direct consequence of this rigidity in the rental market, the share of agents living
with their parents is no longer fixed. This dynamic is presented in Figure 12b. When faced
with a negative income shock, a group of agents living in rental units will see their incomes
drop but their housing costs (in this case rental costs) remain unchanged, thus making
renting unaffordable. A negative income shock therefore leads to a steady-state with more
agents living with their parents, with a shift from ir to i′r. Housing markets remain in
equilibrium as landlords receive Ro from the outside option, which keeps the rental option
attractive for landlords. As in the previous case, prices do not fully capitalize the shock
in young agents’ income, meaning that some will not longer be able to afford to own and
will opt to rent.
Again, the shock will affect young renters’ average affordability, but in the opposite
direction to the previous case, thereby leading to worse (i.e., higher) average affordability
for young renters. The marginal renter will spend all of its income. However, it is possible to
prove that the wealthiest renter will see a decrease in its income in excess of the drop in the
amount spent on housing (as rents are now more rigid than prices), thereby increasing its
affordability ratio. As marginal renter’ affordability remains the same, but the wealthiest
renter’ affordability increases, then the average affordability for renters will increase.
Overall, the results presented in section 3 seem to be in line with the second scenario
provided here. A negative income shock, such as that caused by bad initial labor market
conditions, leads to a higher share of individuals living with their parents, as well as higher
affordability ratios for renters and owners. This would suggest that rental markets have
downward rigidity, and that renting to young people is not as attractive as other rental
options.
4.4 Welfare
The model can be numerically solved to provide some insight into several areas. The
full model, along with its calibration and numerical solution are shown in section G of
the Annex. The first task is to study the welfare impacts of the above-mentioned income
shock on agents. To that end, I develop a measure of welfare at the cohort level that takes
account of both the utility derived from housing allocation and the utility derived from
low affordability ratios19.
Using the calibration shown in detail in section G.1 of the Annex, it is possible to
show that housing welfare in young agents decreases when there is a negative income shock.
In line with the predictions shown in the previous section, welfare decreases more for young
agents when rental markets are rigid. In particular an income loss of 33% for young agents
will imply a 11% decrease in welfare in flexible rental markets while a 39% when rental
market are rigid.
The higher welfare loss experience by young agents in rigid rental market scenarios
is because, in this scenario, more young agents are pushed to live with their parents (and






∗ 0.75− ϕi ∗ 0.25
Where Wa represents welfare for cohort age a. uh,i is the housing utility as defined in the model derived
from the housing option normalized to the rental utility and ϕi represents the affordability ratio for
individual i. The index is set to reflect agents’ decision-making in the model, but also to capture the
negative impact of having a high affordability ratio. The index will have values of between zero and two.
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therefore receive no utility) and owners and renters have higher affordability ratios. Welfare
losses in the case of flexible rental markets are minimized, as housing allocation shifts less
towards the least preferred options, and affordability ratios are not greatly affected. For
older households, welfare is almost not affected when a shock occurs in a flexible rental
market scenario. However, when the rental markets are rigid and a negative income shock
to young agents occurs, then older agents’ welfare will increase significantly. This is because
older agents have more capacity to outbid younger agents in the housing market, since they
are wealthier in absolute terms but now also in relative terms to housing. These results
are depicted in Figure 13.
Figure 13: Effect of a negative income shock on welfare agents, in flexible and rigid rental
market.
Notes: Figure illustrates losses in welfare derived from a negative income shock to individuals. Parameters
are based on the calibration in section G.1.
4.5 Policy Analysis
The model’s numerical solution also allows a policy analysis to be carried out. Con-
sider the case of housing aid in France. This is an interesting case, as almost one in every
three French households receive a housing allowance, one of the highest rates in the OECD.
Additionally, these allowances account for a large part of government spending, given that
it accounted for 0.72% of national GDP, the fourth highest expenditure in the OECD
(OECD, 2018). On average, households receive 30% of their housing expenditure, with
90% living in rental units (Hananel and Richet-Mastain, 2019). In the model, I translated
this policy into one in which 30% of the poorest agents receive housing aid equivalent to
30% of the rental market price and called it APL (Aide Personnalisée au Logement), the
name of France’s the largest housing aid program.
The results shown in Figure 14 indicate that these types of policies are effective
when it comes to alleviating the welfare impact of a negative income shock in rigid rental
markets. In particular, when young agents suffer a 33% income loss, the welfare loss in rigid
rental markets is of 39%, while when implementing a APL-style of policy, welfare losses
are reduced by 7 pp. As young agents have lower incomes than older agents, they will
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be the beneficiaries of this policy, which, has the capacity to diminish the welfare impact
of a negative income shock. The mechanism through which this policy operates is by
increasing young agents’ income and making it competitive with the outside rental option.
This decreases the number of agents who would otherwise be living with their parents.
Additionally, it improves the affordability of renters, since it increase their income.
However, when implementing this policy in a flexible market scenario, the policy
actually causes a drop in young agents welfare. This is because prices and rents do not
adjust, but the policy is not large enough to cover all individuals that suffer an income loss.
This provokes that some agents suffer both an income loss and unchanging rental costs,
pushing them closer to a situation of rigid rental markets. This rents and prices rigidity
introduced by this policy in this scenario, worsens affordability ratios for some young
agents. Welfare for older agents improves, as they capture the rigidity in rents, as well as
being relatively wealthier than young individuals. Thus, applying a housing aid policy in
a flexible rental market scenario makes young agents worse off than not implementing any
policy.
This analysis shows that policies aimed at the housing market can help recover part
of the lost welfare due to a labor market shock, as it helps young agents access ownership
and rental units, and lowers the share of young agents living with their parents. However,
for the policy to improve young agents welfare, the policy must be implemented in the
right scenario.
Figure 14: Welfare effects in a rigid rental market when an APL-style policy is applied.
Notes: Figure depicts the welfare change of a negative income shock, when applying no policy (baseline)
and when applying an APL-style of policy when there is a negative income shock to young agents in both
flexible and rigid markets. Parameters are based on the calibration on section G.1.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I estimated the long-term effects of an increase in the unemployment
rate at graduation time on housing tenure and affordability. I did this for a large sample
of college graduates since 1960 across Europe. I exploited the unemployment rate at the
time of college graduation as an exogenous income shock to the individual. This strategy
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has been explored extensively for career outcomes, but so far not for housing tenure and
affordability. These two outcomes are important, as they are key determinants of an
individual’s welfare.
The results show that a 1 pp increase in the unemployment rate at the time of
graduation leads to a 1.50 pp increase in the probability of living with parents. Additionally,
it lowers the probability of home-ownership by 1.02 pp and renting by 0.45 pp. Worse
conditions when graduating also worsen affordability ratios for owners and renters, with
the effect caused by lower incomes and unchanging housing costs. All of these effects are
persistent over time. This shock also leads to lasting effects on personal earnings, with
the magnitude larger than previously reported in the literature. In line with the previous
literature, the effect is non-significant in health status when restricting to college graduates.
However, initial labor market conditions do have a significant effect on family formation,
with individuals less likely to be in a relationship and, become parents.
Using an overlapping generation model with housing markets, I am able to replicate
recent trends in the housing market, and link these changes to income shocks for younger
generations. The stylized model is a simple exercise that produces several results. Mainly,
that the rental markets’ rigidity can greatly determine whether the welfare shock from the
labor market is absorbed or amplified by the housing market. Rental market rigidity can
be a result of an outside option for landlords, a feature widely documented in the literature.
In particular, if rental markets are rigid, an income shock to young agents will create a
shift away from renting and ownership in favor of the parental home, as the shock works
through quantities rather than prices and rents. Additionally, this shock impacts housing
affordability, worsening affordability for both renters and owners, as their income drops
but housing costs do not.
Finally, I addressed the question whether these shifts in housing tenure affect agents’
welfare and what policies can be used to mitigate the shock. To answer this question, I
numerically solve the model and find that a rigid rental market leads to more acute welfare
losses then flexible rental markets. Additionally, I find that housing aid policies such as the
Aide Personnalisée au Logement (APL) in France can help mitigate the shock by enabling
young agents to afford renting. However, these policies only improve young agents welfare
when implemented in rigid rental markets, pointing towards the importance of identifying
the correct conditions for the application of these policies.
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appendix
A Data Availability in detail
Figure A.1: Data Availability
B Potential Endogeneity
The specification in Equation2 treats the entering in the labor market, determined
by the time of graduation as exogenous. However, individuals may decide to extend their
education so to avoid unfavorable labor market conditions. This potential endogeneity
would attenuate the results toward zero. If additionally there is selection into timing, then
the bias could go either way.
The following graph shows the probability of self defining as a student given the
unemployment rate at the graduation time of the last educational level attained.
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Figure B.2: Effect of a one-point increase in Unemployment Rate at graduation time on
being a student.




Table C.2: Effect of a one-point increase in Unemployment Rate on Housing outcomes
Potential &
Experience
With Parents Owner Renter
1 0.015*** -0.005*** -0.010***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
2 0.016*** -0.006*** -0.010***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
3 0.016*** -0.008*** -0.008***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
4 0.015*** -0.008*** -0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
5 0.014*** -0.008*** -0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
6 0.013*** -0.010*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
7 0.012*** -0.009*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
8 0.010*** -0.008*** -0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
9 0.008*** -0.006*** -0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
10 0.006*** -0.004*** -0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
11 -0.002*** 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.085*** 0.736*** 0.149***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
Observations 18,157 18,157 18,157
Notes: Significance is indicated by * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01. Standard errors, in parentheses,
are clustered at the cohort-region level. Effect of a one point increase in the unemployment rate on housing
outcomes. Results are based on Equation 2. Data from ECHP and EU-SILC.
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Years since graduation
(d) Log of Household’s Income for Owners
Notes: Effect of a one point increase in the unemployment rate on various housing affordability. Afford-
ability is calculated as the yearly housing costs over the household’s yearly income. Results are based on
Equation 2. Data from EU-SILC.
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1 -0.107*** -0.009 -0.012*** 0.009***
(0.018) (0.006) (0.001) (0.002)
2 -0.112*** -0.016*** -0.010*** 0.010***
(0.016) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001)
3 -0.099*** -0.018*** -0.008*** 0.010***
(0.013) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001)
4 -0.090*** -0.018*** -0.007*** 0.007***
(0.012) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001)
5 -0.084*** -0.018** -0.007*** 0.006***
(0.011) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001)
6 -0.075*** -0.014* -0.005*** 0.005***
(0.010) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001)
7 -0.059*** -0.012 -0.006*** 0.005***
(0.010) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001)
8 -0.046*** -0.008 -0.005*** 0.004***
(0.010) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001)
9 -0.040*** -0.003 -0.004*** 0.004***
(0.010) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001)
10 -0.040*** -0.001 -0.004*** 0.003***
(0.011) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001)
11 -0.023*** 0.004* -0.003*** 0.001
(0.007) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000)
Constant 7.073*** 10.130*** 0.757*** 0.041***
(0.045) (0.013) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 13,554 18,092 18,157 17,288
Notes: Significance is indicated by * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01. Standard errors, in parentheses,
are clustered at the cohort-region level. Effect of a one point increase in the unemployment rate on annual
personal earnings. Results are based on Equation 2. Data from ECHP and EU-SILC.
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1 -0.007*** -0.004*** -0.009*** -0.011***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
3 -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.011*** -0.013***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
5 -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.011*** -0.011***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
7 -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.012*** -0.010***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
10 -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.009*** -0.006***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
11 0.004*** 0.001 0.001 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 17,232 17,549 17,549 17,545
Notes: Significance is indicated by * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01. Standard errors, in parentheses,
are clustered at the cohort-region level. Effect of a one point increase in the unemployment rate on Family
Formation outcomes. Results are based on Equation 2. Data from ECHP and EU-SILC.
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Figure C.4: Effect of a one-point increase in Unemployment Rate at graduation time
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(d) Log Weekly Hours Worked
Notes: Effect of a one point increase in the unemployment rate on various labor outcomes. Unemployment
Moths refers to the number of months during last year that the individual classified herself as "unemployed",
temporary employment refers to the type of contract in which the individual is in, which can be fixed or
temporary. Weekly Hours Worked refers to the average number of hours worked by week, if the individual
is not working then the number is equal to zero. Results are based on Equation 2. Data from ECHP and
EU-SILC.
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(d) Being a Parent
Notes: Effect of a one point increase in the unemployment rate at the time of graduation on various
outcomes. Married refers to whether the individual is married on a legal basis or not. Consensual union
refers to whether the individual is living a consensual union, with or without legal basis. Living with
Partner refers to whether there is a cohabitation status with their partner for the ECHP, or whether the
individual’s partner is a part of the household for EU-SILC. Being a Parent refers to whether the individual
can be identified as ”own” / step / adopted / foster parent or guardian of another member of the household.
Results are based on Equation 2. Data from ECHP and EU-SILC.
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1 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001**
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
3 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
5 -0.001** -0.000 0.001 -0.001*
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
7 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
10 0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.001**
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
11 -0.000 -0.002*** -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 17,529 17,188 17,529 14,338
Notes: Significance is indicated by * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01. Standard errors, in parentheses,
are clustered at the cohort-region level. Effect of a one point increase in the unemployment rate on Family
Formation outcomes. Results are based on Equation 2. Data from ECHP and EU-SILC.
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(d) Unmet Medical Examination
Notes: Effect of a one point increase in the unemployment rate at the time of graduation on various health
outcomes. Bad health status refers to whether the person self perceives her health status as "Bad" or "Very
Bad". Chronic illness refers to whether the individuals declares having any chronic illness. Limitation due
to health refers to if the person declares having any sort of limitation in their daily activity due to their
health. Unmet Medical examination refers to whether the person declares not being able to meet a needed
medical examination in the last year. Results are based on Equation 2. Data from ECHP and EU-SILC,
except for Unmet Medical Examination which is only available for the EU-SILC base.
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Figure C.7: Effect of a one-point increase in Unemployment Rate at graduation time on
household’s sources of income.
(a) Log of Transfers from another Household (b) Log of Governmental Housing Allowances
Notes: Effect of a one point increase in the unemployment rate on various housing affordability. Afford-
ability is calculated as the yearly housing costs over the household’s yearly income. Results are based on
Equation 2. Data from EU-SILC.
D Mediation
Figure D.8: Mediation of personal income on living with parents
Notes: Effect of a one point increase in the unemployment rate on living with parents using a as a mediator
personal income. Standard errors are bootstrapped. Data from ECHP and EU-SILC.
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E Robustness
Figure E.9: Effect of a one point increase in the unemployment rate on living with





























Notes: Effect of a one point increase in the unemployment rate on probability of living with parents.
Results are based on Equation 2. Data from ECHP and EU-SILC.
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Figure E.10: Effect of a one-point increase in Unemployment Rate at graduation time
on various outcomes using ECB and ILO Unemplyment Rates.
(a) Net Personal Income (b) Net Household Income
(c) Temporary Employment (d) Living with Parents
(e) Renting (f) Owner
Notes: Effect of a one point increase in the unemployment rate on various outcomes. Results are based
on Equation 2. Data from ECHP and EU-SILC.
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Figure E.11: Effect of a one-point increase in Unemployment Rate at graduation time
on various outcomes using Baseline Specification and adding Country-year Fixed effects.
(a) Net Personal Income (b) Net Household Income
(c) Temporary Employment (d) Living with Parents
(e) Renting (f) Owner
Notes: Effect of a one point increase in the unemployment rate on various outcomes. Results are based
on Equation 2. Data from ECHP and EU-SILC.
F Results using all educational levels
When analyzing the result in terms of educational level achieved, there are some
noticeable differences. First, lower educated individuals are less affected by an increase
in the unemployment rate when finishing their education. In terms of the possibility of
becoming a homeowner, the exposure to higher levels of unemployment when graduating
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does not seems to affect in a different way according to each educational level. However,
in the decision of renting and living with parents there are some differences. In particular,
low educated individuals are more likely to rent by themselves rather than living with their
parents when unemployment increases. This could be a potential labor market response.
In the other hand, higher educated individuals are more likely to stay with their parents
rather than rent by themselves. Again this could be a potential response mechanism, in
where higher educated individuals can afford to spend longer time unemployed and being
su pported by their families and lower educated population can not afford such thing.
















































































































Notes: Effect of a one point increase in the unemployment rate at the time of graduation on various
outcomes. Owner refers to living in owned dwelling by one member of the household, without any parent
being present. Similarly, Renting refers to living in a dwelling that is being rented by the households but
without any parent present. Finally, with Parents refers to living in a dwelling where at least one parent
is present, irrespective of the tenure status. Results are based on Equation 2. Data from ECHP and
EU-SILC.
G An Overlapping Generations Model for Housing Tenure
In this section, I develop a theoretical framework to study the effects of an income
shock in younger generations has in housing markets. This model builds on the work
by Carozzi (2020) and Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2006), where authors propose a tractable
model with income and housing heterogeneity with no uncertainty, and with outside options
for rental. The framework for this research, adds the possibility of income shocks in young
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households. For that, I assume an OLG with no uncertainty, where agents live for two
periods with heterogeneity in income but not on housing quality, and the total mass of
agent is equal to 1 in each age.
I show that in steady states with lower income for young households and with a non
binding outside option, a lower share of them are homeowners and more are living in rental
units. This is because these young households are priced out by the older, wealthier agents,
and then marginal buyers are then forced to rent. Additionally, I show that in steady-state
with lower income for young households and a binding outside option for rental, a larger
fraction of them will live with their parents.
The model proposes a set of predictions that will be tested with the micro-level data
in section G.1.
Incomes
Agents are born with no wealth but heterogeneous in their income.
Let ea(i) be he endowment at age a ∈ (1, 2) of type i ∈ [0, 1] such that ea(i) → R+
continuous and increasing. For notation purposes we can also write e(i) = e1(i)(1+r)+e2(i)
Assumption 1: e1(i) can be written as e1(i) = ψe2(i) where ψ ∈ (0, 1).
Housing Stock
Agents can either: live with their parents, rent, own, or become landlords (owning
more than one unit, living in one and renting the other one). The housing stock for
ownership is fixed so S = So. Prices are depicted with pt, which are prices for housing at
time t, and Rt is the rent paid in advance at time t.
An important assumption is that S < 2 so no all agents can rent or own a unit,
therefore some are forced to live with parents.
Borrowing Constraints
They enter the model via down-payment requirements. Let γpt be amount borrowed
for housing at time t. Then (1−γ)pt is the amount borrowed for housing at t, and (1−γ)pt
is the down-payment. Finally, γ represents the maximum LTV ratio.
We impose a restriction in which a household can only have one mortgage at a time.
Additionally, we assume: r < min[γ, 1 − γ] so that households can always pay their debt
in the SS. There is no default.
Affordability
Agents will pay different sums with respect to each housing tenure choice, in partic-
ular they will pay 0 when living with parents, R when renting, and p(1 − γ) when being
homeowners.
Agents dedicate different shares of their income to meet their housing costs, define
this ratio for young agents as Affyh where h ∈ [p, r, o] for those living with parents,
renting, and homeowners respectively.
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The Affyh will be equal to









Preferences are established over a housing and a numeraire good. Let Uct,ht be the
household’s utility, that can be expressed as Uct,ht = ct+uh(τt) where ct is the consumption
of the numeraire good, and uh(τt) residential choice in t. Housing tenure decision can be
expressed as: τt = (τr,t, τo,t)′.
The utility derived from this decision is uh(τt) =

0 if living with parents.
uvo if renting.
vo if owner.
As u < 1 then the utility from renting is lower that of being owner. Finally, there is
a utility discount: β, and an interest rate r; and we assume that β(1 + r) ≥ 1
Su pply of Rental
The su pply of rental units comes form landlords agents, who own more than one
unit, living in one and and renting the other one. Let λt(i, a) denote the number of units
rented by agents of age a, type i at time t. There is no guarantee of rp = R in equilibrium
as there are no deep pocketed investors.
There is an outside option for rental, which can be understood as tourists or a
reserve value of leaving the accommodation empty. Landlords will decide to rent to young
households as long as the rent that they perceive from the them (Ry) is larger than the
rent from the outside option (Ro), then the market rent (R) will be: R = max[Ry, Ro].
Timing and Decisions
The timing of the decisions is the following for households: 1.Derive utility. 2.
Receive endowment. 3. Pay Interest. 4. Receive Interest. 5.Trade housing. 6. Derive
utility from consumption.
Every period agents decide: to buy or not units, to become landlords, where to reside
next, and to consume or save. They choose ct, ht+1, τt+1, λt+1. But as only households
with more than one unit are landlords, then λt+1 is given by ht+1. So, λt+1(i, a) =∑
ht+1(i, a) − 1 if ht+1 > 0 and 0 otherwise. Additionally, as all consumption happens




• b(i, a) be the non-housing net wealth s.t. i, a→ R.
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• h(i, a) be the housing wealth s.t. i, a→ τt.
• V a(b, h) agents value function at age a.
=⇒ V a(b, h) = max(τ ′,h)c+ uh(τ) + βV a+1(b, h)
Policy functions are τ ′(i, x, a) and h′(i, x, a) which map the type, age, and state of
the economy, to the optimal decision. The law of motion for individual non-housing wealth
is:
b′ = (1 + r)(ea(i)(1− 1[τ ′ = 0]) + b− c− P (h′ − h) +R(λ− τr))
Long-Term Equilibrium
Regarding the housing market we can identify the following features:
• Pt = n(Rt, pt) set of prices
• bt(i, a) : gross savings
• ht(i, a) : housing allocations in age/type space:[0, 1]× [1, 2]
• τt(i, a): housing decisions
=⇒ Housing market clearing:
• DR1 (Pt) +DR2 (Pt) +DRout(Pt)1{Ry < Ro} = SR(Pt)
Demand for rental (from age one and two) and the demand from outside option for
rental (if binding) is equal to su pply of rental.
• SR(Pt) +DO1 (Pt) +DO2 (Pt) = So
Demand for owner (from age one and two) , plus su pply of rentals must be equal to
su pply of owner housing.
Where SR(Pt) is su pply of rented units,Dha(Pt) is the demand of h tenure (Rent,Owner)
by agent age a buying or renting in t. It is clear here that su pply of owners is exogenous
and fixed, while su pply of rental is endogenous.
Parameter Conditions
To ensure that credit constraints are binding for all agents (which implies that in-
centives for home ownership are always present) and that the Steady State equilibrium has
a lifetime transition following a housing ladder (where old potential buyers outbid young
ones), the the following conditions must apply:
1. vo > e(1)r/(1− γ): owner occupation is always worth the user cost of housing.
2. uvl > R: renting is always worth the rental price
3. e1(2− So) > e1(1)r/(1− γ): becoming a landowner of a unit is profitable.
Now in order to make the SS with a housing ladder structure we impose that:
4. e2(0) > e1(2− So): Only young agents are priced out.
5. e1(1) < p(2− γ)−R: Only old agents become landlords.
6. e(1) > p(1− γ) + p(1 + r)−R: Some agents are able to own more than one unit
7. e2(1) < p(1− γ) + 2p−R: Landlords cannot rent out two properties.
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Steady State
In the steady state is possible to state the following price bonds exists:
• R = e1(2− So)
• P ≥ e1(2− So)(1− γ)−1
The intuition behind this is the following. For rents, if they were higher there would
be a larger share than 2 − So living with their parents, and if was lower, a larger share
than 2−So would be able to afford renting, in any case there would not be equilibrium in
the rental market. As for prices, if they were lower than e1(2− So)(1− γ)−1, then a mass
larger than 2 − So individuals would be able to own, and markets do not clear. A more
detailed proof is in appendix H.1.
Allocations
We define thresholds in the type distribution of agents that determine the distribution
of households across units:
• iyr , iyo: thresholds for which beyond young agents can afford to rent and own.
• ioldr , ioldl : thresholds for which beyond old agents can afford to own and be landlords
(own a unit and rent the other).
The value for each of the thresholds are estimated in appendix H.2, and they can be
depicted in the following way:















The position of these thresholds depend entirely on the model parameters. But it
is possible, by using the assumptions and the price ordering such that R(1 − γ)−1 < P ,
to prove that the SS allocations will be similar to those shown by Figure G.13, with the
following relationship between thresholds:
• iyr < iyo < 1 < iyl
• ioldr < ioldo < ioldl
• ioldh < i
y
h ∀ h = [R,O]
• ioldo < i
y
r
• iyo < ioldl < 1
The proofs for this thresholds inequalities are in appendix H.2. Then the housing
market20 equilibrium conditions are:
20Given these thresholds we can use them to also depict the demands for different types of housing:
DR1 = i
y
o − iyr ; DR2 = ioldo ; SR = 1− ioldl ; DO1 = 1− iyo ; DO2 = 1− ioldo
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• 3− ioldo − i
y
o − ioldl = So.
Which can be read as the demand from old households to own (1 − ioldo ) plus the
demand from young households to own (1 − iyo) plus the demand from landlords to
own their owner-occupied unit (1− ioldl ) must be equal to the total su pply of owner
housing (So).
• ioldo + i
y
o − iyr = 1− ioldl .
Which can be read as the demand from old households to rent (ioldo ) plus the demand
from young households to rent (iyo − iyr) must be equal to the total su pply of rental
housing (1− ioldl ).
Proposition Case 1: outside option non-binding
A lower ψ leads to a steady state in which less young households are Owner and
more young households are Renter, and less old households are Renter. The shock will
leads to higher average affordability ratio for young Owner and lower ratio young Renter.
As for housing costs, while rents fully capitalize the shock while prices only capitalize it
partially. This new SS can be depicted as shown by Figure G.14.

















Notes: This picture depicts the changes in the SS caused by a drop in ψ. With lower incomes, young
marginal owners households are forced to rent, while as rents adjust fully to the new income, the share
living with aprents remains the same.
Proof: See appendix H.3.
Rents adjust fully to the new income, as they are solely determined by the young
agents income, therefore they fall in the same proportion as ψ. Prices in contrast, do
not absorb fully the shock as they also depend on the income by old agents. With rents
adjusting to the new income, the marginal renter does not change, and neither does the
share living with their parent. As prices drop less than the young agents income, the
previous marginal owner can no longer afford prices, and now less young agents will be
homeowners.
As for older agents, there will be less living in rental units, as they see rents fall
but their income remain unchanged. This increases the share of older agents living in
owned units. The share of agents becoming landlords will increase or decrease depending
on whether the drop in demand from rental units from older agents is larger than the
increase in demand for rental units from younger agents. The share of landlord adjust so
that rental market is in equilibrium.
As for the affordability, young renters see both rents and income fall in the same
proportion, so the affordability ratio should not change. However, the new steady state
includes individuals with higher income, that in the previous steady state would have own
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a unit. These "wealthier" agents will have lower affordability ratio, and that causes the
average affordability for renters to fall. As for owners, agents have a drop in income but a
drop not as large in prices, this will push average affordability up.
Proposition Case 2: outside option binding
A lower ψ leads to a steady state in which less young households are Owner and
more households are living with Parents, while less old households are Renter. This also
leads to higher average affordability ratio young Owner, and potentially also in Renter.
Prices will partially capitalize the shock, and rents will capitalize the shock depending on
how binding is the outside option.
Additionally, in the particular case when the outside option is fully binding (that is
that rents capitalize nothing of the shock) the average affordability for young Renter will
be higher than for young Owner. Also it is possible to show that the share of Landlords
increases. This shifts in the steady state can be depicted as shown by Figure G.15.

















Notes: This picture depicts the changes in the SS caused by a drop in ψ when the outside option is binding.
With lower incomes, young marginal owners are forced to rent, while as are forced to rent.
Proof: See appendix H.4.
Rents are now determined by the outside option, so they will fall in proportion to
how binding is the outside option. Prices will partially capitalize the shock, not falling as
much as incomes. The marginal renter will now be determined by that individuals whose
income is equal to the outside option, an income higher than the new equilibrium rents,
therefore there will be more individuals living with their parents. Again as As prices drop
less than the young agents income, the previous marginal owner can no longer afford prices,
and now less young agents will live with parents.
As for older agents, there will be less living in rental units, as they see rents fall but
their income remain unchanged. This increases the share of older agents living in owned
units. The share of agents becoming landlords will increase or decrease depending on
whether the drop in demand from rental units from older agents is larger than the increase
in demand for rental units from younger agents, as those units previously used by renting
young agents, are now rented to the outside option. The share of landlord adjust so that
rental market is in equilibrium.
As for the affordability ratios, young renters experience a drop in their income but
not a equally proportional drop in the rents, if the relative drop in rents is lower than the
relative drop in prices, then the average affordability for renters will go up. As for owners,
agents have a drop in income but a drop not as large in prices, this will push average
affordability up.
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In the particular case when the outside option rent is equal to the rent in the initial
steady state, rents do not capitalize anything of the shock, the average affordability ratio
for renters will increase, and it will be higher than for homeowners. This is because while
income fall both for owners and renters, while prices for owners do adjust (although not
fully), in this case rents remain the same. There will also be more landlords as princes go
down (which makes it cheaper to buy a unit) and rents remain the same, making it more
attractive to become a landlord. The rental market is in equilibrium as there is also more
demand for rental units coming from young agents.
G.1 Calibration
In order to study the transition period between steady states I use a numerical
analysis of the response of the features of the model that are of interest, namely, allocations
for young individuals and affordability outcomes. The code is set to solve a recursive
equilibrium as noted in appendix H.5.
In each period a N individuals are born in each cohort. Income and parameters
satisfy conditions presented on the Parameter Conditions section, which leads to a steady
state characterized as Figure G.13. The shock of interest is an unexpected reduction in ψ
in period 0. The transition allows prices and rents to adjust as to ensure equilibrium in
rental and ownership market across all the transition.
The set of parameters are provided in Table G.15, and they follow those in Carozzi
(2020). Housing stock So is equal to 1600, which implies that 400 individuals (40% of the
young population) will be living with their parents. Income distributions are uniform in
all periods. The initial value of ψ is 0.3, which means that old agents income is three times
as much of those of the younger individuals. This is broadly in line with data, and ensures
that young agents are outbid by older ones even with high levels of γ. I show the case
of ψ dro pping up to 0.2. In Table G.15 depicts all the values for the parameters in the
transition analysis. I will study two types of scenarios, one in which the outside option is
non-binding and one in which the outside option is fully binding.











The transition towards a steady state with a lower ψ with a non-binding outside
option is depicted in Figure G.16. The left graph shows the allocations for young individ-
uals, and the right one depicts the affordability ratios for young individuals. In line with
predictions of the model, the number of young agents living with their parents remains un-
changed, while there is a trade-off between ownership and renting. The final state is reached
within four periods, in which markets adjust in such a way as there is always equilibrium.
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The periods immediately after the shock there is a spike in the share of renters (and a low
point in ownership) as prices tend to adjust more slowly than individuals incomes. As for
the graph on the right, it depicts the evolution of the affordability ratios. After reaching
the new steady state, rental households have lower affordability ratios, as there are new
"wealthier" renters. As for owners, the average affordability ratio goes higher, as prices
fall less than young agents income.
Figure G.16: Transitions after an income shock on young individuals, with non binding
outside option.
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(a) Young agents allocations
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Affordability for young agents
Affordability Renters
Affordability Owners
(b) Young agents affordability
Notes: The left panel depicts the transition for the allocation of young individuals, while the right panel
shows the transition for the average affordability ratio.
The transition for the case in which the outside option is fully binding is shown in
Figure G.17. The left graph shows the allocations for young individuals, while the right
one shows the transition for the affordability ratios. In line with predictions of the model,
the number of young agents living with their parents increases, while there is a decrease
in the number of young agents living in rental units and in owned units. The size of the
increase in the share of young individuals living with parents will be linked to how binding
is the outside option. The more inflexible the rents are, the more younger agents will be
forced to live with their parents. While the final equilibrium is reached within two periods
for agents living with parents, for rental and ownership agents, as markets need to be in
equilibrium it takes up to four periods to reach the final allocation.
As for the average affordability it is possible to see that the ratio increases both for
renters and owners, and in line with the predictions, is larger for renters. The transition
reaches its final steady state allocations and affordability in four periods. In period zero
the share of renters peaks (as the share of owners reaches its minimum) because prices
do not adjust immediately (as to maintain equilibrium in the markets), making ownership
unaffordable for a greater share of young agents.
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Figure G.17: Transitions after an income shock on young individuals, with binding
outside option.
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(a) Young agents allocations
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Affordability for young agents
Affordability Renters
Affordability Owners
(b) Young agents affordability
Notes: The left panel depicts the transition for the allocation of young individuals, while the right panel
shows the transition for the average affordability ratio.
These results, and more particularly those in which the outside option is binding,
are similar to those found in the empirical section of the paper.
H Theoretical Framework Proofs
In this sections I provide the different proofs and derivations required for the model.
This sections is organized as follows:
1. Price Bonds and Rental Market
2. Thresholds
3. Proof Proposition Case 1
4. Proof Proposition Case 2
5. Recursive equilibrium form
6. Indirect utilities in the Steady State
H.1 Price bonds
• R = e1(2− So).
Proof (by contradiction):
– Assume that R < e1(2− So), and considering that uv > e(2− So), then house-
holds that are not able to occupy would rent, so a mass larger that 2−So would
be willing to rent in age 1, and in age 1 and 2. Which would create and excess
demand, so R ≥ e1(2− So).
Now assume that R > e1(2 − So) then a mass larger that 2 − So of young
households would be homeless by the end of each period. So rental markets
would not clear, then R ≤ e1(2− So).
Then R = e1(2− So).
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Additionally:
• P ≥ e1(2− So)(1− γ)−1
Proof (by contradiction):
– Assume P < e1(2−So)(1−γ)−1, which is equal to P (1−γ) < e1(2−So). This
implies that a mass of agents age 1 that can buy a unit is m1o > 1 − (2 − So),
but as older agents outbuy younger (e2(0) > e1(2 − So)), then m2o = 1. This
implies that mo = m1o +m2o > So− 1 + 1 = So. So more can afford to own than
the actual offer of, so the solution is that P ≥ e1(2− So)(1− γ)−1.
Finally, rental markets exists as long as there are incentives to rent and some agents
are able to own two units. This is ensured with conditions 1 to 6. Condition X ensure that
at least some agents are able to own when young and then buy another unit when old.
There will be incentives to rent as long as R > rp and as the market equilibrium condition
ensures that R = e1(2− S), then Condition 3 ensure the existence of rental market.
H.2 Thresholds
So the thresholds for young agents are:
• iyr = e−11 (R)
• iyo = e−11 (p(1− γ))
• iyl = e
−1
1 (p(1− γ) + p)
And the thresholds for old agents are:
• ior = e−1(R)
• ioo = e−1(p(1− γ) + (1 + r)R)
• iol = e
−1(p(1− γ) + (1 + r)p−R)
Proof : iyr < iyo < 1 < iyL
This conditions follows from the relation on prices R < (1 − γ)p. If we consider also the
previous mentioned restriction e2(0) > e1(2 − So) and the price bound R = e1(2 − So),
the we have that ioldr < 0, which means old agents always afford renting. Finally, 1 < i
y
l is
ensured by Condition 5.
Proof : ioldr < ioldo < ioldl
This conditions is true given the prices ordering r < (1 − γ)p and what we know about
period one decision from condition iyo > ioldo , this let us prove that ioldr < ioldo . ...
Proof : ioldh < i
y
h ∀ h = [R,O]
For the case of ior < i
y
r , we know that ioldr < 0, and that i
y
r must be larger than zero, as
otherwise there will be no agents living with their parents.
As for ioo < i
y
o, there are two scenarios, when ioo = e
−1
2 (p(1 − γ)) and when ioo =
e−1(p(1− γ)) +R(1 + r)). On the first case agents were living with their parents, while on
the second case they were living in rental units.
On the first case, when ioo = e
−1
2 (p(1 − γ)), as we know that e1(i) < e2(i)∀i then
e−12 (p(1−γ)) < e
−1
1 (p(1−γ)) is proved. As for the case when ioo = e−1(p(1−γ))+R(1+r))
we know it to be true as having rented when young requires more income than on the first
case.
Proof : iyo < iol < 1
The statement ioldl < 1 is given by the existence of rental markets, proven in the appendix.
To prove that iyo < iol , using condition 6...
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H.3 Proof Proposition Case 1
The case with non binding outside option can be characterized as one in which
Rf > R
o with Rf being the rent after the income shock. That is that the rent in the new
steady state is still larger than the outside option rent.






. With both functions being positive. Additionally as e1(i) = ψe2(i) we can say






A. To prove the changes in housing tenure we need to derive the thresholds for hous-
ing allocation:













































= 0. Then there are the same share of young individuals
living with their parents.
























Which implies that there are less old agents living in rental units.
3. The third threshold determines the share of young agents living with as home-

































I will proceeded by contradiction, and show that any
































































If we consider that the market equilibrium condition must still apply, we can write



















































4. Finally we can derive the rental market equilibrium, iyo + ioo + y
y
r = 1− iol , wrt ψ:
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= 0, the sign of 1 − iol will depend on
which effect dominates, if the increase in rental units from young agents or the drop in
rental units from older agents.
B. The second part of the proposition refers to the affordability ratios. First lets
define ψi, Ri and pi as the equilibrium parameters values before the shock, and in the same
way ψf , Rf and pf as the equilibrium parameters after the shock. So to prove the changes









These inequalities imply that while rents will change in the same proportion as ψ, prices
will change in a less than the changes in ψ.













This is in line with previousresults, as it implies that rents fully capitalize the shock,
and respond one-to-one to changes in ψ.
The second inequality implies that prices do not fully adjust to a shock in ψ. This



















This follows the intuition behind that while on one hand rents fully capitalize the
income shock, as they are determined solely by young agents income, prices on the other
hand, do not fully capitalize the shock as they are also determined by older agents income
(which are unaffected), therefore falling less than rents.












As mentioned before the affordability refers to the ratio between what agents pay
for their housing tenure and its income. Now the average affordability for young renters
(owners), will be the average between the marginal renter (owner) affordability and the
wealthiest renter (owner) affordability.
Define ϕyri and ϕ
yr
f as the initial and final average affordability of renters, which
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The ratio has two parts, the first one refers to the marginal renter located in iyr that
will dedicate all of its income to renting and therefore have and affordability ratio equal to
one. The second one is the "wealthiest" renter, that just below the marginal owner, that
will have an income approximately the same the marginal owner, but will pay only R for
its income. The average affordability for renters after the income shock is calculated in an





















With the last inequality being proved before.





















In a similar way to renters, the average affordability is the average between the
marginal owners affordability ratio, who spends all of its income to down-payment and
therefore is one. And the "wealthiest" homeowner, which has an income equal to e1(1).

































has already been proved.
H.4 Proof Proposition Case 2
The case for binding outside option can be characterized as one in which Rf < Ro,
that is that the rent from the final steady state is lower than the outside option one.
A. The proof of the case when the outside option is binding is very similar to the
previous case. In fact the proof for the effect on iyo, ioo and iol are the same.
21The wealthiest renter will be the agent that can just not afford to own. As the income distribution is
continuous I can assume that the income of the wealthiest renter will be approximately equal to that of
the marginal owner (e1(p(1− γ)).
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< 0. Then there are more young individuals living with their
parents.
B. Now it is possible to prove that with the outside option binding, the average
affordability for renters can increase. As in the previous part, the average affordability for


































So the average affordability ratio will increase as long as rents absorb less of the
shock than prices. In the particular case for Ro = Ri we will have that:
ϕyri < ϕ
yr
f ⇐⇒ 1 >
pf
pi
The intuition behind this is that young renters will have lower income, but as rents
do not adjust, this will increase the affordability ratio for those already renting.
Additionally, for the case in which the outside option is fully binding, we can prove






















As we know, even when the outside option is binding, rents and prices must comply













Which the last part we know to be true as the wealthiest young household must be
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able to afford a down-payment for a unit.
H.5 Recursive Equilibrium
The recursive equilibrium is compromised by: set of decisions rules for housing pur-
chases, tenure choice and becoming landlord, value function. price functions mapping the
state of the economy to the real line, and set of states of the economy, and a law of motion
for the state of the economy. The conditions for these to for a recursive equilibrium are:
H.5.1 State Variables
The state of the economy at the beginning of the period is given by:
x = (h(i, 2), h(i, 3), b(i, 2), b(i, 3))
with h(i, a) : [0, 1]→ N+ and b(i, a) : [0, 1]→ R
in which h(i, 2) and h(i, 3) map agents types to their owned units at age 2 and 3. Analo-
gously, b(i, 2) and b(i, 3) map the non-housing wealth of agents i at age 2 and 3.
H.5.2 Choice Variables
In each period, individuals decide for a = [1, 2]: housing assets h′(i, x, a), non housing
assets b′(i, x, a), tenure choice τ ′(i, x, a) and the decision to become a landlord γ′(i, x, a).
H.5.3 Constraints
Three constraints fall into agents decisions. budget, credit and housing tenure con-
straints.
Budget constraints (law of motion of non-housing assets) for a = 1, 2:
b′(i, b, h, h′, x, a) =
(1 + r)(ea(i)(1− 1{τ ′(i, a) = 0}) + b(i, a)− c− p(h′(i, x, a)− h(i, a) +R(λ′(i, x, a)− τ ′R(i, x, a))))
Credit constraints, as to ensure mortgage on one unit only for a = 1, 2:
Γ(i, b, h, h′, x, a) = {h′ ∈ N2 : ea(i) + b+ Ph(i, x, a) ≥ γP (x)1{h′ > 0}}
Tenure constraints, as to ensure that owner occupation can only be done if being a
homeowner for a = 1, 2:
τ ′(i, x, a) ∈ {0, 1}if h′(i, x, a) ≥ 1
τ ′(i, x, a) = 0if h′(i, x, a) = 0
H.5.4 Value Functions and Decisions Rules
Now its time to define policy functions: fh for housing assets, fτ for housing tenure




fh(i, x, 1) solves v1(i, x) = max
h′∈Γ(i,0,0,h′,1)
v2(i, b
′(i, 0, 0, h′, 1), h′, x′)
fh(i, x, 2) solves v2(i, x) = max
h′∈Γ(i,b,h,h′,x,2)
uh(τ(i, 2) + βv3(i, b
′(i, b, h, h′, 2), h′, x′)
fh(i, x, 3) solves v3(i, x) = max
h′∈Γ(i,b,h,h′,x,3)
uh(τ(i, 3) + b+ P (h− h′)− b′(i, b, h, h′, x′)
Becoming a Landlord
λ(i, x, a) =
h′(i, x, a)− τ ′(i, x, a) if R(x) ≥ 00 otherwise
Housing tenure
For values large enough of vo:
τ(i, h, a) =
(0, 1) if h(i, x, a) ≥ 1(1, 0) if b+ ea(i) > R(x) & h(i, x, a) = 0
Housing Market Clearing Conditions∫
h′(i, x, 2) + h′(i, x, 3) di = So∫
λ′(i, x, 2) + λ′(i, x, 3) di =
∫
τ ′R(i, x, 2) + τ
′
R(i, x, 3) di
Law of Motion
The law of motion is given by:
b(i, 2) = b′(i, 0, 0, fh(i, x, 1), 1)
b(i, 3) = b′(i, b(i, 2), h(i, 2), fh(i, x, 2), 1)
h(i, 2) = fh(i, x, 1)
h(i, 3) = fh(i, x, 2)
H.6 Indirect utilities in Steady State
Assuming that β(1 + r) ≥ 1 the we can assume that consumption by agents takes
place at age 3. In steady state the prices that they face are the same along their life
periods.
Indirect utilities foe each path of lifetime tenure choices are:
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V P,P = β2[e3(i)]
V P,R = β2[e2(i)(1 + r) + e3(i)− (1 + r)R] + β2µvo
V R,R = β2[e(i)(1 + r) + e3(i)−R((1 + r) + (1 + r)2)] + β2µvo + βµvo
V R,O = β2[e(i)(1 + r) + e3(i)−R(1 + r)2 − rp] + β2vo + βµvo
V O,O = β2[e(i)(1 + r) + e3(i)− (r2 + 2r)p] + β2vo + βvo
V O,L = β2[e(i)(1 + r) + e3(i)− (r2 + 2r)p+ (1 + r)R] + β2vo + βvo
In steady state, housing prices p have to be smaller than e(1)/(1−γ) so to ensure that
at least the richest young agent can afford to buy. Then by assumption 1 we can say that
owner occupation is always worth the cost. As rents are pinned by income distribution,
R = e1(2− So), if rental market exists. Then using assumptions a1 and a2 on preference
parameters, and the prices bonds, and the expressions for indirect utilities we can say that:
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